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1 Introduction
A topic that has received considerable attention in new open economy macro-
economics (NOEM)1 is the international transmission of monetary policy.
The NOEM literature has shown that the transmission of monetary shocks
across countries is predicated by the currency denomination of international
trade. Most of the contributions that address the international transmis-
sion of monetary shocks, including the seminal Redux model of Obstfeld
and Rogo¤ (1995, 1996), assume that export prices are set in the producer’s
currency. The literature refers to this case as "producer currency pricing"
(PCP). In this case, there is complete pass-through of exchange rate changes
to import prices.
Among others, Betts and Devereux (2000, 2001) have assumed that …rms
can price discriminate across countries and export prices can be set in the
consumers’ currency. This case is referred to as "local currency pricing"
(LCP) or "pricing-to-market" (PTM). I use the former term. In this case,
exchange rate pass-through to import prices is zero.2 In Betts and Devereux
(2000), the authors incorporate LCP into the Obstfeld-Rogo¤ (1995) model.
The authors show that the degree of short-run exchange rate pass-through is
crucial for the international transmission of monetary shocks. For example,
in the case of LCP (PCP) monetary shocks generate high positive (nega-
tive) co-movement of output across countries and large negative (positive)
co-movement of consumption. In addition, in the case of PCP a domes-
tic monetary shock unambiguously raises both domestic and foreign welfare
(Obstfeld and Rogo¤ 1995, 1996) whereas in the case of LCP a domestic
monetary shock reduces foreign welfare (Betts and Devereux 2000).
One limitation of the recent literature is that it has focused primarily
on the case where exchange rate pass-through is symmetric, i.e. the same
for both countries. A third possibility, that all export prices are set in one
currency, has received less attention despite it being "probably the most rel-
evant from an empirical viewpoint" (Corsetti – Pesenti 2005, 22). I refer
to this case as "dollar pricing" (DP). In the DP case, exchange rate pass-
through is asymmetric. If all …rms set export prices in the home country’s
currency, exchange rate pass-through is zero in the home country and one
in the foreign country. The assumption of asymmetric export pricing seems
1Lane (2001) provides an extensive survey of the NOEM literature. Lane and Ganelli
(2003) focus on the exchange rate pass-though debate and the role of the current account
and net foreign assets in adjustment dynamics.
2Engel (2002), Obstfeld (2002) and Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000) discuss how low pass-
through of exchange rate changes to consumer prices a¤ect the expenditure switching e¤ect
of a nominal exchange rate change.
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to be important in the light of the results of Schmidt (2006). The empiri-
cal literature on the international e¤ects of monetary shocks shows that US
monetary shocks increase both US and "foreign" (typically non-US G7) con-
sumption and output (see e.g. Holman and Neumann 2002). This evidence
is not easily reconciled with symmetric pricing (PCP/LCP). Schmidt (2006)
shows that under DP a monetary shock increases both domestic and foreign
output and consumption.
The main purpose of this paper is to analyse the international trans-
mission of monetary shocks in the DP case. This includes carrying out an
analysis of the welfare e¤ects of monetary shocks. To address these issues,
I develop a standard two-country NOEM model that is based on Betts and
Devereux (2000). I extend the Betts-Devereux model in two ways. The main
extension is the introduction of asymmetric price setting (i.e. dollar pric-
ing). Betts and Devereux (2000) assume that the same fraction of …rms in
each country set prices in the consumers’ currency. I instead assume that
the fraction of LCP can be di¤erent across countries. Second, I introduce a
Calvo-type staggered price setting. The assumption of staggered price set-
ting, as opposed to the hypothesis of simultaneous one-step-ahead pricing,
allows for richer dynamics in the responses to monetary shocks.
As mentioned, there is a substantial literature on the international e¤ects
of monetary shocks. These papers, among others, include Sutherland (1996),
Pierdzioch (2003) and Schmidt (2006). All of these papers develop a NOEM
model that makes use of a staggered price setting and numerical simulations.
The present model is in one special case, where all export prices are set in
the producer’s currency, almost identical to the model of Sutherland (1996).
On the other hand, in the other special case, where all export prices are
set in the consumer’s currency, the model is identical to Pierdzioch (2003).
A limitation of these papers is that only the positive e¤ects of monetary
shocks are analysed. I also study the normative (welfare) e¤ects of monetary
shocks. The international transmission of monetary shocks in the case where
exchange rate pass-through is asymmetric is analysed by Schmidt (2006).3
Schmidt (2006) extends the basic NOEM framework in several directions
while I retain the basic framework so that the results of this model are easy
to compare with those in the preceding literature.4 In addition, a limitation
3The assumption of dollar pricing is also used in the papers by Devereux et al. (2003),
Devereux et al. (2007) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2005). These papers, however, do not
address the topic of this paper.
4In this paper, in contrast to Schmidt (2006), there is no home bias in consumption, I
abstract capital formation, there is only one international traded asset and the elasticity
of substitution between goods produced in the same country is the same as the elasticity
of substitution between goods produced in di¤erent countries.
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of Schmidt’s (2006) paper is that only the e¤ects of domestic monetary shocks
are analysed. I analyse the e¤ects of both domestic and foreign monetary
shocks.
One of the main …ndings of this paper is that a DP model can explain the
observed asymmetry in the transmission of monetary policy: domestic (US)
monetary policy a¤ects domestic (US) output more than foreign (European)
monetary policy a¤ects foreign (European) output. I show that under DP a
domestic monetary shock increases domestic output and consumption more
than a foreign shock increases foreign output and consumption. This implies
that DP can explain the asymmetry in the transmission of monetary policy.
Angeloni et al. (2003) …nd that a one percentage point increase in the US
short-term interest rate has a substantially stronger negative e¤ect on US
output than a one percentage point increase in the Eurozone’s interest rate
has on the Eurozone’s output. This implies that US monetary policy is more
e¤ective than Eurozone’s monetary policy in terms of in‡uencing the coun-
try’s own output. In this paper, I demonstrate that asymmetric exchange
rate pass-through can explain the relative ine¤ectiveness of monetary policy
in the Eurozone.
As mentioned, Schmidt (2006) demonstrates that DP can imply that a
domestic monetary shock increases both domestic and foreign output and
consumption, consistent with empirical evidence. In this paper, I present
results that call into question the robustness of Schmidt’s (2006) results. I
show that under DP a domestic monetary shock generates a positive e¤ect
on foreign output if the expenditure switching e¤ect is weak i.e. the elasticity
of substitution between domestic and foreign goods is su¢ciently low and/or
prices are su¢ciently sticky. For example, if the elasticity of substitution
between domestic and foreign goods is high, the international transmission
of domestic shocks under DP appear to be similar to PCP i.e. domestic
monetary shocks generate high positive co-movements of consumption across
countries and negative co-movements of output across countries.
The model also o¤ers important insights into the welfare e¤ects of mone-
tary policy under PCP. The introduction of staggered pricing into a standard
NOEM model does not change any of the main results of Obstfeld and Rogo¤
(1995, 1996). As mentioned, one of the striking results of Obstfeld and Rogo¤
(1995, 1996) is that a monetary shock under PCP raises both domestic and
foreign overall welfare by equal amounts. I show, however, that a monetary
shock is a "beggar thyself" policy that substantially reduces domestic welfare
and increases foreign welfare in the short run. This is because a monetary
shock causes an increase in domestic output without an equivalent increase
in consumption due to a deterioration in the terms of trade and the accu-
mulation of net external assets. This implies that even though the terms of
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trade and current account e¤ects do not a¤ect overall welfare under PCP,
they still have important implications for welfare dynamics. In the long run,
a monetary shock increases domestic welfare and reduces foreign welfare.
Finally, I demonstrate that DP has important implications for welfare. In
the short run, the welfare e¤ects of a monetary shock under DP appear to be
more similar to PCP than LCP: a monetary shock reduces domestic welfare
but increases foreign welfare. The DP case reintroduces the current account
as an important channel through which monetary policy a¤ects welfare in the
short run. A monetary shock reduces welfare, notwithstanding the improve-
ment in the terms of trade. The current account e¤ect dominates the terms
of trade e¤ect to an extent that the increase in consumption is much smaller
than the increase in output in the …rst period after the shock. Therefore, do-
mestic welfare is reduced in the short run. In the long run, a monetary shock
raises domestic welfare but reduces foreign welfare. As in Schmidt (2006),
the discounted present value of the change in utility is more similar to LCP
than PCP: a monetary expansion under DP is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the
model and derives the equilibrium conditions. Section 2 presents and dis-
cusses the international transmission of monetary shocks, using illustrative
numerical calculations. Section 3 concluded the paper.
2 The Model
2.1 Country Size and Market Structure
The world economy consists of two countries, home and foreign.5 For con-
creteness, the home country is referred to as the "US" and the foreign country
as "Europe". There is a continuum of …rms and households that are indexed
by ? 2 [0? 1]. A fraction ? of households and …rms are located in the US while
the fraction 1 ¡ ? are located in Europe. Each …rm produces a di¤erenti-
ated good, however, there are two types of …rms. A fraction of …rms in each
country can "price-to-market". These …rms set their prices in the currency
of the buyer. I refer to these …rms as LCP …rms. In the US (Europe) the
fraction of LCP …rms is ? (?¤). The rest of …rms set a uni…ed price across
the countries. These …rms set their prices in the currency of the producer
and I refer to these …rms as PCP …rms. These …rms let prices abroad move
one-to-one with the exchange rate.
Three special cases are worth observing. First, when ? = ?¤ = 0, all
export prices are set in the producer’s currency - the PCP case. Second, in
5As mentioned in the Introduction, the model is based on Betts and Devereux (2000).
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the LCP case: ? = ?¤ = 1. Third, when ? = 0 and ?¤ = 1, all export prices
are set in US dollars. As mentioned in the introduction, I refer to this case
as dollar pricing.
Empirical evidence provides support for the asymmetry in price setting. A
report by ECU institute (1995) summarizes that the national currency is the
principal currency used for the denomination of national exports. However,
the US is an exception, with 92% of exports and 80% of imports invoiced
in US dollars (ECU institute 1995). Tavlas (1997) …nds that 98% of US
exports and 89% of US imports were invoiced in dollars in 1992-1996. Tille
and Goldberg (2005) …nd that 95% of US exports and 85% of US imports
were invoiced in dollars in 2003. Thus "there is asymmetry such that U.S.
exports to Europe are heavily invoiced in dollars, but European exports to
the U.S. are also invoiced in dollars" (Devereux et al. 2003, 224). Hence, it
is essential to study the international transmission of monetary shocks in the
case where all export prices are set in one currency.
2.2 Households
2.2.1 Preferences
All households have identical preferences. The utility function of the repre-
sentative US household is given by6
?? (?) =
1X
?=?
??¡?
"
log?? +
?
1¡ ?
µ
??
??
¶1¡?
¡ ?? (?)
2
2
#
? (1)
Here ? is the discount factor, ? is a consumption index (de…ned below),
? and ? are positive parameters, ? is the nominal balances and ? is the
consumer price index (de…ned below). The variable ? is the household’s
supply of labour. The consumption index is
? =
24 1Z
0
?(?)
?¡1
? ??
35
?
?¡1
?
where ? (?) is consumption of good ? and ? ? 1 measures the elasticity of
substitution between di¤erentiated goods. The consumer price index is
?? =
24 ?Z
0
?? (?)
1¡? ?? +
Z ?+(1¡?)?¤
?
?? (?¤)
1¡? ?? +
Z 1
?+(1¡?)?¤
(???? (?¤))
1¡? ??
35 11¡? ?
6In the presentation of the model that follows, the equations for the foreign country
are identical to those of the home country unless they are explicitly discussed.
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Prices ? represent dollar prices, prices ? represent euro prices and ? is the
exchange rate (the dollar price of the euro). In general, European variables
are indicated by asterisks but in the context of goods prices an asterisk means
a price set by European …rm ?¤. Hence, ?? (?) is the dollar price of a US good,
?? (?¤) is the dollar price of European good ?¤ and ?? (?¤) is the euro price of
a European good. Similarly, the European price index is
? ¤? =
264?(1¡?)Z
0
(?? (?) ???)
1¡? ?? +
?Z
?(1¡?)
?? (?)
1¡? ?? +
Z 1
?
?? (?¤)
1¡? ??
375
1
1¡?
?
2.2.2 Budget Constraints and First-Order Conditions
Households receive a wage income, dividends from …rms and transfers from
the government (seigniorage revenues). Households use income to purchase
consumption goods and to accumulate money and a nominal bond. House-
holds can hold two assets, national money and international assets. I assume
that the only internationally traded asset is a riskless nominal bond, denom-
inated in dollars. The budget constraint of the representative US household
is
?? + ???? = ??¡1 +??¡1 + ???? ¡ ???? + ?? + ??? ?? (2)
Here ?? is the dollar price of the bond (?? = (1 + ??)
¡1, where ?? is the US
nominal interest rate) that pays one dollar in period ?+1, ?? denotes bonds
held by the household at the beginning of period ?, ? is the nominal wage
paid to the household in a competitive labour market and ? denotes the
nominal pro…ts (dividends) of US …rms. Each US household owns an equal
share of all US …rms. The government repays all seigniorage revenues to
households in the form of lump-sum transfers.
Since bonds are denominated in dollars, the budget constraint of Euro-
pean households is
?¤? + ?
¤
?
?¤?
??
=
?¤?¡1
??
+?¤?¡1 + ?
¤
? ?
¤
? ¡ ? ¤? ?¤? + ?¤? + ? ¤? ? ¤? ? (3)
The European nominal interest rate is determined by uncovered interest par-
ity
(1 + ?) = (1 + ?¤)
??+1
??
?
This implies that the realized return in dollars on the international bond at
the beginning of period ? is (1 + ??)??¡1???. The global asset-market-clearing
condition requires ??? + (1¡ ?)?¤? = 0.
6
The …rst-order conditions for the maximization problems for US and Eu-
ropean households are7
????+1??+1 = ?????? (4)
?¤??
¤
?+1?
¤
?+1??+1 = ??
¤
? ?
¤
? ??? (5)
?? =
??
????
? (6)
?¤? =
?¤?
?¤? ? ¤?
? (7)
??
??
=
µ
???
1¡ ??
¶ 1
?
? (8)
? ¤?
? ¤?
=
Ã
??¤?
1¡ ?¤???+1??
!1
?
? (9)
Equations (4) and (5) are the Euler equations for optimal US and European
consumption, respectively. Equations (6) and (7) govern the optimal labour
supply. Households equate the marginal disutility of supplying an extra unit
of labour with the marginal utility of extra private consumption that can
that the extra labour supply brings. Equations (8) and (9) show that the
demand for money is an increasing function of consumption and a decreasing
function of the interest rate.
2.3 Monetary Policy
I abstract from government spending so the transfers to households are given
by
? ? =
?? ¡??¡1
??
? (10)
The money supply is assumed to follow a …rst-order autoregressive process
described by the following equation
?^? = ??^?¡1 + ?????
where percentage changes from the baseline are denoted by hats and ???? is
an unpredictable shift in the money supply. I use the Dornbusch (1976) ex-
periment of an unanticipated permanent rise in the money supply, assuming
? = 1.
7Since the model hitherto is identical to that of Betts and Devereux (2000), the …rst
order conditions are the same as in their model.
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2.4 Firms
2.4.1 Technology and Pro…ts
Each …rm produces a di¤erentiated good. The production function of the
representative US …rm is
?? (?) = ?? (?) ? (11)
where ? (?) is the total output of …rm ? and ? (?) is labour input used by …rm
?. For US LCP …rms, total output is divided between output sold in the US,
?? (?), and output sold abroad, ?? (?). Pro…ts are given by
????? (?) = ?? (?) ?? (?)¡ ???? (?) ? (12)
????? (?) = ???? (?) + ???? (?) ?? (?)¡ ???? (?) ? (13)
????? (?
¤) = ?? (?¤) ?¤? (?
¤)¡ ?¤? ?¤? (?¤) ? (14)
????? (?
¤) = (?? (?¤) ?¤? (?
¤)) ??? + ?? (?¤)?¤? (?
¤)¡?¤? ?¤? (?¤) ? (15)
Equation (12) shows the pro…ts of a US PCP …rm. Equation (13) shows the
pro…ts of a US LCP …rm. Equations (14) and (15) show the pro…ts of the
corresponding European …rms.
The demands for the products are given by
?? (?) =
µ
?? (?)
??
¶¡?
??? +
µ
?? (?)
??? ¤?
¶¡?
(1¡ ?)?¤? ? (16)
?? (?) =
µ
?? (?)
??
¶¡?
???? (17)
?? (?) =
µ
??
? ¤?
¶¡?
(1¡ ?)?¤? ? (18)
?¤? (?
¤) =
µ
???? (?¤)
??
¶¡?
??? +
µ
?? (?¤)
? ¤?
¶¡?
(1¡ ?)?¤? ? (19)
?¤? (?
¤) =
µ
?? (?¤)
??
¶¡?
???? (20)
?¤? (?
¤) =
µ
?? (?¤)
? ¤?
¶¡?
(1¡ ?)?¤? ? (21)
Equation (16) shows the demand for a US PCP …rm. Equations (17) and
(18) show the demand for a US LCP …rm in the US and European markets,
respectively. Corresponding European equations are (19)-(21).
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2.4.2 Price Setting
In the absence of nominal rigidities, for example, US LCP …rms would max-
imize ????? (?) with respect to ?? (?) and ?? (?). This would imply
?? (?) = ???? (?) =
?
? ¡ 1??? (22)
This implies that the price of good ? a constant markup over marginal cost.
Without nominal rigidities, the law of one price holds and good ? is sold at
the same price in both markets, when expressed in the same currency. US
PCP …rms maximize ????? (?) with respect to ?? (?). The price of good ? is
a constant markup over marginal cost.
I now turn to staggered price adjustment. I consider a discrete-time
version of a model proposed by Calvo (1983). Each …rm resets its prices
with a probability 1 ¡ ? in each period, independently of other …rms and
independently of the time elapsed since the last adjustment. When setting
its pro…t-maximizing price, every …rm has to take into account that in every
subsequent period there is a probability 0 ? ? ? 1 that it will not be able to
revise its price setting decision. When setting a new price in period t, each
…rm seeks to maximize the present value of pro…ts weighting future pro…ts
by the probability that the price will still be in e¤ect in that period. For
example, the representative US LCP …rm seeks to maximize
max
??(?)??¤? (?)
? ???? (?) =
1X
?=?
??¡??????
???
? (?) ?
where ???? = ¦
?
?=? (1 + ??)
¡1 is the US nominal discount factor between period
? and period ?. The result is that the pricing rules are given by
?? (?) =
µ
?
? ¡ 1
¶ P1
?=? ?
?¡???????
³
1
??
´¡?
??P1
?=? ?
?¡???????
³
1
??
´¡? ? (23)
?? (?) =
µ
?
? ¡ 1
¶ P1
?=? ?
?¡??????
¤
?
³
1
?¤?
´¡?
??P1
?=? ?
?¡??????¤?
³
1
?¤?
´¡?
??
? (24)
Equation (24) demonstrates that US export prices, expressed in euros, do
not change when the nominal exchanges rate changes. This implies that
exchange rate pass-through to export prices is zero. The pricing rule for a
US PCP good is the same as equation (23). This implies that US PCP …rms
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let euro prices move one-to-one with the exchange rate, i.e. there is complete
exchange rate pass-through to export prices. The corresponding European
equations are
?? (?¤) =
µ
?
? ¡ 1
¶ P1
?=? ?
?¡??¤?????
³
1
??
´¡?
?¤?P1
?=? ?
?¡??¤?????
³
1
??
´¡?
1
??
? (25)
?? (?¤) =
µ
?
? ¡ 1
¶ P1
?=? ?
?¡??¤????
¤
?
³
1
? ¤?
´¡?
?¤?P1
?=? ?
?¡??¤????¤?
³
1
? ¤?
´¡? ? (26)
2.4.3 Symmetric Equilibrium
All …rms in a country are symmetric and every …rm that changes its price in
any given period chooses the same output and sets the same price, consistent
with equations (23)-(26). The structure of price setting implies that each
period a fraction of …rms, 1¡ ?, sets a new price and the remaining fraction
keeps their price unchanged.
Equations (10), (13) and (14) can be substituted into (2) to derive the
consolidated budget constraint of the US economy. Making use of the global
asset-market-clearing condition, the consolidated budget constraint of the
European economy can be calculated analogously. The consolidated budget
constraints can be written as
???? = ??¡1+(1¡ ?) ?? (?)?? (?)+? [?? (?)?? (?) + ???? (?) ? (?)]¡????? (27)
¡ ?
1¡ ??
¤
?
??
??
= ¡ ?
1¡ ?
??¡1
??
+ (1¡ ?¤) ?? (?¤) ?¤? (?¤) (28)
+?¤
·
?? (?¤)?¤? (?
¤) +
?? (?¤) ?¤? (?
¤)
??
¸
¡ ? ¤? ?¤? ?
The model is log-linearised around a symmetric steady state where all
exogenous variables are constants. In addition, I consider the special case
where initial net foreign assets are zero. The optimal labour supply (6),
the production function (11) and the pricing rule (22) imply that in initial
equilibrium
¹?0 = ¹?0 =
µ
? ¡ 1
?
¶1
2
?
where the subscript zero on barred variables denotes the initial steady state.
The log-linearisation is implemented by expressing the model in terms of
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percentage deviations from the initial steady state. Those variables whose
initial steady state value is zero are normalized by consumption. Equilibrium
is sequences of variables that (i) clear the labour, goods and money markets
in each region in each period, (ii) satisfy the optimality conditions for con-
sumption evolution, (iii) satisfy the optimal pricing rules and (iv) satisfy the
intertemporal budget constraints.
3 The International Transmission of Mone-
tary Shocks
In this section, I analyse the international e¤ects of monetary shocks, using
illustrative numerical simulations. First, I brie‡y discuss the parameterisa-
tion of the model. The main point of this paper is to analyse the international
transmission of monetary policy under DP and to compare these results with
those of Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995, 1996) and Betts and Devereux (2000).
The model, however, extends the basic framework in two ways: by the in-
troduction of staggered price setting and asymmetric pricing. Thus the dif-
ferences in the results could be coming partly from the currency choice of
pricing and partly from the staggered pricing mechanism itself. I therefore
…rst discuss the international transmission of monetary shocks under sym-
metric pricing i.e. under PCP and LCP. This section shows how staggered
price setting a¤ects the results of Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995, 1996) and Betts
and Devereux (2000). These results allow for distinguishing the consequences
of asymmetric pricing with those of staggered price setting. The next step
is to discuss the international e¤ects of monetary shocks under DP. In this
section, I also implement a sensitivity analysis to study to what extent the
international e¤ects of monetary shocks may be sensitive to the choice of
some key parameter values.
3.1 Parameterisation
The parameterisation of the model mostly follows Schmidt (2006), making
it easy to compare the results of this model with those of Schmidt (2006).
Periods are interpreted as quarters. The discount factor ? is set to 0?99, which
implies a 4 percent annual real interest rate. The price stickiness parameter
? is set to 0.75, implying an average delay between price adjustments of four
periods (one year). The parameter ? is set to 1. The two countries are
assumed to be of equal size, i.e. ? = 0?5. The consumption elasticity of
money demand (1??) is set to 1.
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In this model, unlike in Schmidt (2006), the same parameter (?) governs
the elasticity of substitution between two goods produced in the same country
and the elasticity of substitution between two goods produced in di¤erent
countries. Schmidt (2006) set the former elasticity to 10 and the elasticity of
substitution between domestic and foreign goods to 1.5. Obstfeld and Rogo¤
(2000a, Section 2.3) brie‡y survey the literature on empirical estimates of the
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. They quote
estimates in the range of 1.2 to 21.4. Typical estimates, however, are in the
range of 5 to 6. I set ? to 6. This parameter value is widely used in the
related literature, as e.g., in Sutherland (1996). I simulate the model using
the algorithm developed by Klein (2000) and McCallum (2001).
3.2 Simulation Results: Symmetric Pricing
In this section, I study the international transmission of a US monetary shock
under both PCP and LCP. Consider the Dornbusch exercise of an unantici-
pated permanent rise in the relative US money supply. Figure 1 (on Page 29)
shows the dynamic responses of key macroeconomic variables to 1 percent
rise in the US money supply. In all …gures, the vertical axes show percentage
deviations from the initial steady state. The change in bond holdings is, how-
ever, expressed as a deviation from initial consumption. Panels (a) through
(f) depict the e¤ects of a monetary shock under PCP, and panels (g) through
(l) show the e¤ects of the same shock under LCP. The real exchange rate is
Real exchange rate =
??? ¤?
??
?
The US terms of trade are (de…ned as) the (Calvo-weighted) relative price of
US exports in terms of US imports. Thus the US terms of trade improve if
this index rises.
The welfare analysis of monetary policy is somewhat more complicated
than in the basic NOEM models. Typically in the NOEM literature all prices
are …xed for one period and the new steady state is reached after one period.
In this framework, the welfare e¤ect of a monetary shock is the sum of the
short run change in utility and the discounted present value of the change in
steady state utility. Because of the staggered price setting, I use a di¤erent
method to evaluate welfare changes. First, I study changes in one period’s
utility. Then I calculate the discounted present value of the change in utility.8
8For instance, in Schmidt (2006): "[w]elfare e¤ects were derived as the discounted sum
of all future utility changes compared to the steady-state path of utility."
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The change in utility in period ? is given by9
?^? = ?^? ¡ ¹?20?^??
The discounted present value of the change in utility is
?^??? =
1X
?=?
??¡??^??
Figure 1 illustrates the changes in period’s utility. Table 1 shows the changes
in period utility in the 1st and 20th period and the discounted present value
of the change in utility.
Table 1: Welfare E¤ects of Monetary Shocks
?^1 ?^ ¤1 ?^20 ?^
¤
20 ?^??? ?^
¤
???
PCP -1.1 1.2 0.022 -0.022 0.16 0.16
LCP 0.43 -0.32 0 0 1.6 -1.3
DP - US shock -0.31 0.47 0.12 -0.12 0.97 -0.48
DP - European shock 0.42 -0.36 -0.12 0.12 -0.64 0.81
3.2.1 Producer Currency Pricing
In the PCP case, the model is virtually identical to that of Obstfeld and
Rogo¤ (1995, 1996) and completely identical to Betts and Devereux (2000)
in the special case of their model where all …rms set their prices in the con-
sumers’ currency, expect for the extra dynamics introduced by the staggered
price setting. Panel (a) through (e) show that the positive (as opposed to
the normative) e¤ects of a monetary shock are almost identical to those of
Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995, 1996) and Betts and Devereux (2000). The only
exception is that, because a fraction of …rms can adjust their prices imme-
diately after the shock, the short run change in the terms of trade is smaller
than the change in the exchange rate. However, the manner in which the
welfare e¤ects of monetary shocks are analysed highlights some important
perspectives. Since the PCP case is known in the NOEM literature, I discuss
only the e¤ects of a monetary shock that are vital in understanding welfare
results.
A monetary expansion lowers the real interest rate and thus raises global
consumption demand. A monetary shock depreciates the nominal exchange
rate which raises the relative prices of European goods, shifting global de-
mand toward US goods away from European goods.10 This expenditure
9As typical in the literature, I neglect the utility derived from real balances.
10Because preferences are identical across regions and the law of one price holds for all
goods, the CPI-based real exchange rate is always constant.
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switching e¤ect of a nominal exchange rate change increases US output and
decreases European output as long as prices are sticky, as shown in Figure
1, panel (a). The depreciation of the dollar therefore also causes a short run
increase in relative US consumption. To smooth consumption, US house-
holds save part of this extra income by running a current account surplus
(see panel (e) in Figure 1). With higher long run wealth, US households
choose to decrease their labour supply, consequently decreasing US output
in the long run. A fall in the supply of US goods causes a deterioration of
US terms of trade. These e¤ects are, however, relatively weak: US output
decreases by just less than 0.01 percent and the terms of trade deteriorate
by just less than 0.05 percent in the long run.
Panel (b) of Figure 1 illustrates that a shock also increases consumption
in Europe. In the short run, the depreciation of the dollar increases the
dollar price of imports but leaves export prices una¤ected. Consequently,
the US terms of trade deteriorate in the short run. The improvement in the
European terms of trade and the fall in the interest rate lead to an increase
in European consumption.
One of the main results of Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995, 1996) is that a
monetary shock increases US (domestic) and European (foreign) overall util-
ity by the same amount, despite asymmetric output e¤ects. This appears to
also be the case in this model: the discounted present value of the change in
utility is 0.16 in both countries.11 The liquidity e¤ect of monetary policy in-
creases world output, bringing it closer to its e¢cient level and consequently
increasing overall welfare in both countries.
Panel (f), however, illustrates that the asymmetric output e¤ects of mon-
etary policy do have important implications for welfare in the short run. In
the short run, US consumption increases less than proportionally to output
due to the deterioration in the US terms of trade and the accumulation of
external assets. Therefore, a monetary expansion is a "beggar-thyself" policy
in the short run. In the long run, the short run US current account surplus
implies a permanent US trade balance de…cit which allows consumption to
remain above US output. This trade balance de…cit and the improvement in
the US terms of trade have a positive e¤ect on long run consumption and
11In the Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) model, the overall welfare e¤ect of a monetary shock
is ?^??????? = ?^¤??????? =
?+?(1¡?)
?
h
??^ + (1 ¡ ?) ?^¤
i
. Using the same parameters values
as in the present model, the previous equation implies that a monetary shock increases
domestic and foreign utility by 0.083 percent in the Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) model.
This amounts to approximately half of the welfare gain of this model. Why? In the present
model, the parameter value chosen for staggered pricing implies an average delay of four
periods for pricing adjustment while Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) have prices that are sticky
for one period. This implies a stronger liquidity e¤ect of monetary policy in this model.
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consequently on welfare. In addition, a fall in labour supply increases steady
state utility. Thus US utility increases by 0.022 percent in the long run.
A US shock increases European welfare in the short run because of an
increase in consumption and a fall in employment (output). The international
welfare spillover is reversed in the long run, due to the changes in the patterns
of European consumption and employment. With lower wealth, European
households choose to work more and output increases in the long run. This
reduces welfare but also causes an increase in the supply of European goods
and therefore a deterioration of the European terms of trade. In addition,
to service the debt, Europe must run a trade balance surplus. This trade
balance surplus and the deterioration in the terms of trade have a negative
e¤ect on consumption and thus on welfare. In the long run, European utility
decreases by 0.022 percent.
The analysis of this section shows that even though the terms of trade
and current e¤ects of monetary policy do not a¤ect overall welfare, they still
have signi…cant consequences for welfare both in the short and long run.
The two countries gain in equal measure from the overall utility changes.
The liquidity e¤ect of monetary policy increases world output closer to its
e¢cient level and increases global welfare in the short run. In the short run,
the welfare gains of European households are higher than the welfare losses
of US households. In Europe, the short run welfare bene…ts from higher
consumption and lower labour supply dominates the long run welfare losses
from lower consumption and higher labour supply. In the case of the US, the
long run welfare bene…ts from higher consumption and lower labour supply
dominates short run welfare losses. Thus both countries bene…t from a US
monetary expansion.
3.2.2 Local Currency Pricing
Panels (g) through (l) in Figure 1 show that under LCP the introduction of a
staggered price setting into the Betts and Devereux (2000) model changes the
main results of their paper only slightly.12 The nominal and real exchange
rate are not perfectly correlated in the short run because a fraction of …rms
can adjust their prices immediately after the shock. For the same reason, the
change in the terms of trade is smaller that the movement in the nominal
exchange rate. Figure 1 highlights the main …nding of Betts and Devereux
12Pierdzioch (2003) extends the model of Betts and Deverueux (2000) by the introduc-
tion of the Calvo price setting framework. He analyses the positive e¤ects of monetary
shocks in the presence of full LCP. Thus, the model of this paper, in the LCP case, repli-
cates the results of Pierdzioch (2003). In addition, I also analyse the welfare e¤ects of
monetary shocks.
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(2000): The international e¤ects of monetary shocks are sensitive to the
pricing of exports. Panel (g) shows that outputs are perfectly positively
correlated. Panel (l) demonstrates that a monetary expansion under LCP is
a "beggar-thy-neighbour" policy that raises US welfare and reduces European
welfare, consistent with Betts and Devereux (2000).
The impact on output is primarily determined by the direct demand in-
crease by US households’. With no exchange rate pass-through, this direct
demand increase is identical for both US and European goods, and output
increases by the same amount in both countries. When US …rms price their
exports in dollars, the exchange rate depreciation increases their pro…ts mea-
sured in dollars. It also reduces the pro…ts of European …rms measured in
euros. The dollar’s depreciation thus generates a change in the distribu-
tion of income favouring the US, increasing US consumption and decreasing
European consumption. Since a monetary shock does not generate short
run current account imbalances, monetary policy is neutral in the long run.
The impact on output is determined primarily by the direct demand increase
coming from US households. With no exchange rate pass-through, this direct
demand increase is identical for both US and European goods, and output
increases by the same amount in the both countries. When US …rms price
their exports in dollars, the dollar’s depreciation increases their pro…ts mea-
sured in dollars. On the other hand, it reduces the pro…ts of European …rms
measured in euros. The dollar’s depreciation thus generates a distribution of
income toward the US, increasing US consumption and reducing European
consumption. Since a monetary shock does not generate short run current
account imbalances, monetary policy is neutral in the long run.
A US monetary expansion raises US welfare in the short run. The pos-
itive e¤ect of the resulting higher consumption is larger than the negative
e¤ect resulting from higher employment (output). A US monetary expan-
sion, however, reduces European welfare. The reason behind this result is
that a US monetary shock reduces European consumption due to the dete-
rioration of European terms of trade. The discounted present value of the
change in utility in the US is 1.6 and in Europe -1.3.
The results of this section highlight the consequences of the introduction
of a staggered price setting into the basic NOEM framework. These results
give us a good benchmark to evaluate how DP itself a¤ects the international
transmission of monetary policy. As shown in this section, the Calvo-pricing
mechanism does not change the main predictions of the basic NOEM models.
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3.3 Simulation Results: Dollar Pricing
3.3.1 US Monetary Shocks
Figure 2 (Panels (a) through (f)) demonstrates the macroeconomic e¤ects
of a US shock under DP and under the baseline calibration. It shows that
a US shock generates a negative co-movement of output and a positive co-
movement of consumption across countries. Panel (f) illustrates that a shock
reduces US welfare but raises European welfare in the short run. In compar-
ison to the PCP and the LCP cases, the dynamic e¤ects of a monetary shock
under DP appear to be more similar to PCP than LCP. Table 1 illustrates
that a US monetary shock is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy.
A monetary shock temporarily lowers the real interest rate and raises
global consumption demand. The rise in global demand has di¤ering e¤ects
on US and European output, because of the exchange rate change. In the
DP case, exchange rate pass-through is asymmetric: It is zero in the US
and one in Europe. In Europe, with sticky prices, the depreciation of the
dollar implies that European goods become more expensive relative to US
goods. European households substitute consumption towards US goods and
away from European goods. The strength of this expenditure switching e¤ect
depends on the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods.
The expenditure switching e¤ect causes an increase in US income and thus a
rise in relative US consumption. As panel (e) shows, to smooth consumption,
US households save part of this income by running a current account surplus.
In case of sticky prices in the US, the relative price of US to European
goods is una¤ected. The impact of a monetary shock on the output of the two
countries is in‡uenced by the direct demand increase by US households. This
direct demand increase is identical for both US and European goods. The
e¤ect is dominated by the expenditure switching e¤ect: European output
falls in the …rst period. However, the direct demand increase implies than
European output rises by almost 0.1 percent in the medium run.
Panel (c) displays that the depreciation of the dollar is smaller than the
relative increase in the money supply, as in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995). A US
monetary shock generates a short run current account surplus which entails a
permanent rise in relative US consumption. This mitigates the depreciation
of the dollar and the dollar depreciates by 0.99 percent. In the DP case, as
in the LCP case (Betts and Devereux 2000), the exchange rate overshoots if
the consumption elasticity of money demand is less than one (? ? 1). Panel
(c) also demonstrates that the nominal depreciation translates into a real
depreciation.
A US monetary shock increases European consumption in the short run.
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A decrease in European output reduces income in the short run. In addition,
the depreciation of the dollar a¤ects the earnings of European …rms. When
European …rms price their exports in dollars, the depreciation of the dollar
reduces their earnings measured in euro terms. This reduces European con-
sumption. This e¤ect is, however, dominated by other, positive e¤ects. The
exchange rate depreciation induces a fall in the European CPI allowing for
an increase in consumption in the short run. In addition, European house-
hold increase their consumption by running a current account de…cit. In the
long run, the accumulation of external debt and a deterioration of European
terms of trade imply that European consumption falls in real terms. This
e¤ect, however, is very weak: European consumption falls by just less than
0.01 percent.
A closer look at Panel (b) of Figure 2 reveals that US consumption in-
creases in the long run by just more than 0.01 percent. The accumulation of
external assets and the improvement in the US terms of trade have a posi-
tive e¤ect on long run US consumption. US households, with higher long-run
wealth, choose to work less (the opposite happens in Europe). A fall in the
supply of US goods raises their relative price.
Panel (d) in Figure 2 illustrates that the US terms of trade improve,
despite the fact that both US exports and imports are set in dollars. In
the short run, a fraction of …rms sets new prices and an outward shift in the
demand curve facing the US …rms allows them to raise their prices. Therefore
the US terms of trade also improve in the short run.
Table 2 shows that the overall welfare e¤ect of a US monetary shock is
positive on US welfare and negative on European welfare. This is consistent
with Schmidt (2006) who only analyses the overall welfare e¤ect of a mone-
tary shock, however. Comparing the Obstfeld and Rogo¤ setup of PCP and
the Betts and Devereux setup of LCP with the present model, I …nd that the
overall welfare e¤ect of a monetary shock under DP is similar to LCP. A US
monetary shock increases US welfare at the expense of Europe by adversely
a¤ecting European terms of trade, as in the LCP case. The channel through
which a US shock deteriorates the European terms of trade is, however, dif-
ferent. Under DP, it is optimal for US …rms to raise their prices due to higher
demand and therefore the US terms of trade improve in the short run. Under
LCP, the depreciation of the dollar improves the US terms of trade in the
short run. Since US terms of trade improve by less under DP in the case of
LCP, a US monetary shock increases US overall welfare by less than in the
case of LCP.
Panel (f) of Figure 2 illustrates the response of US and European period
utility to a monetary expansion. In the short run, a US monetary shock re-
duces US welfare but increases welfare in Europe. In this respect, the short
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run welfare e¤ects are more similar to PCP, notwithstanding the improve-
ment in the US terms of trade. As mentioned, US households are willing
to lend resources abroad for consumption smoothing purposes. This current
account e¤ect dominates the terms of trade e¤ect. As a result, the increase in
consumption is much smaller than the increase in output in the …rst period
after the shock. US welfare is therefore reduced in the short run. The DP
case reintroduces the current account as an important channel through which
monetary policy a¤ects welfare in the short run. Even though the current
account e¤ect does not a¤ect overall welfare, it has important implications
for welfare dynamics.
In the long run, the external wealth implies a fall in labour supply and
a permanent US trade balance de…cit which allows consumption to remain
above US output. In addition, the improvement in the US terms of trade has
a positive e¤ect on consumption and consequently on welfare. As mentioned,
Table 1 shows that a US monetary shock increases US overall welfare as the
improved terms of trade and higher wealth allow US households to …nance
higher real consumption at a lower level of labour supply in the long run.
Sensitivity Analysis
One of the main …ndings of Schmidt (2006) is that DP provides a better …t
to some stylized facts than other pricing schemes (PCP or LCP). Several em-
pirical papers have shown that US monetary policy has a positive e¤ect on
the output of the rest of the world. For example, Betts and Devereux (2001)
and Kim (2001) …nd that U.S. monetary shocks have a positive economic
impact on non-US G7 countries. Holman and Neumann (2002) …nd that US
monetary shocks have a positive e¤ect on both Canadian output and con-
sumption. Schmidt (2006) …nds that asymmetric exchange rate pass-through
implies that a monetary shock causes positive cross country correlations in
both output and consumption. This is not, however, the outcome of these
computations.
The above discussion suggests that the e¤ect of a monetary shock on
European output may be sensitive to the parameters that govern the strength
of the expenditure switching e¤ect, e.g. the elasticity of substitution between
domestic and foreign goods. The larger the elasticity (high ?), the stronger
the expenditure switching e¤ect. Panels (g) and (h) of Figure 2 show the
e¤ects of a monetary shock on output and consumption in the case where
this elasticity is low (? = 3) but still higher than in Schmidt (2006) in which
this elasticity is set to 1.5.13
13Only the e¤ects on output and consumption are shown. The setting of ? = 3 has
virtually no impact on other variables than outputs. Except for the fact that the welfare
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A low elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods im-
plies that the expenditure switching e¤ect is weak in Europe. Thus the direct
increase in demand by US households dominates the expenditure switching
e¤ect. In addition, European output rises. Thus a monetary shock causes
a positive cross country correlation in output. This suggests that the result
of Schmidt (2006), which sees a monetary shock under DP generate posi-
tive cross country correlations in output and consumption, is not a generally
applicable result, but is likely to be dependent on a low "elasticity of trade".
Another important parameter that determines the strength of the expen-
diture switching e¤ect is the degree of price rigidities. If prices were more
‡exible, the expenditure switching e¤ect would become weaker and peter out
faster. Panels (i) and (j) of Figure 2 illustrate the e¤ects of a monetary shock
on output and consumption in the case where the fraction of …rms setting a
new price in each period is increased to 0.5 (? = 0?5).14
With more ‡exible prices, the correlation between US and European out-
put becomes positive in the short run as the expenditure switching e¤ect is
dominated by the direct demand increase coming from US households. The
depreciation of the dollar does not a¤ect the relative price of imports as much
as in the previous case. This implies that consumption substitution toward
US goods away from European goods becomes weaker in Europe. The di-
rect increase in demand by US households also becomes weaker than before.
This e¤ect now more than o¤sets the expenditure switching e¤ect, however.
European output, therefore, increases.
If the expenditure switching e¤ect is relatively weak, asymmetry in export
pricing lead to results that conform more closely to the stylized fact that US
monetary shocks have a positive e¤ect on both US and European output and
consumption. This result may be relevant with regards to the fact that a con-
siderable share of world export pricing is conducted in US dollars. In terms
of the correlations of output and consumption across countries, however, the
results provide for more risk sharing than is typically shown in the data.
The results show that a monetary shock generates a positive co-movement of
consumption across countries that is larger than a positive co-movement of
output across countries. This is consistent with a number of open economy
models. It is inconsistent, however, with empirical evidence (Backus et al.
1992).
e¤ects of the shock are di¤erent in the case of ? = 3? This is likely to be caused by the fact
that this parameter also determines the initial level of output implying that equilibrium
output is far below the socially optimal level. Thus any increase in consumption is more
likely to be welfare-improving.
14The consequences of varying ? on the other variables than European output are purely
quantitative.
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3.3.2 European Monetary Shocks
I now turn to study the macroeconomic e¤ects of a European monetary shock
and consider the same unanticipated, permanent rise in the money supply.
Figure 3 shows the macroeconomic e¤ects of US and European monetary
shocks on output, consumption and welfare. Only these e¤ects are shown
because the responses of other variables are analogously to the case of a US
shock. The solid lines show the e¤ects of a US monetary shock and the
dashed lines show the e¤ects of a European monetary shock. The "country’s
own output" refers to US (European) output in the case of a US (European)
shock and the "other country’s output" refers to European (US) output in
the case of a US (European) shock.
It is worth observing that the assumption of DP is not the only asymme-
try in the model as the nominal bond is denominated in dollars. However,
due to the setting of ? = 1, nominal interest rates are equalized across coun-
tries and thus realized returns on the international bond are also equalized
across countries. The real interest rates can diverge across countries due to
violations of the law of one price. Thus the international inequality of the
interest rates is caused by DP not by the fact that the bond is denominated
in dollars.
Figure 2 and Table 1 reveal three noteworthy results. First, a US mone-
tary expansion increases US output and consumption by more than a Euro-
pean expansion increases European output and consumption. Second, while
a US monetary shock increases European consumption, a European shock
reduces US consumption. Summing up I …nd that US monetary shocks gen-
erate positive co-movements of consumption across countries while European
shocks generate negative co-movements. Three, notwithstanding the fact
that the origin of the shock has important implications for consumption and
output, the welfare e¤ects of monetary shocks are almost identical. Both US
and European shocks increase the country’s own welfare at the expense of
the other country’s welfare.
The di¤erences in the international transmission of US and European
monetary shocks stem from asymmetric exchange rate pass-through. Both
a European monetary shock and a US shock, cause an exchange rate depre-
ciation. In the case of a US shock, the direct increase in demand by US
households increases demand for both US and European goods because the
depreciation of the dollar does not a¤ect the price of imports to the US. In
the case of a European shock, however, the depreciation of the euro raises
the price of imports in Europe and European goods become cheaper relative
to US goods. The expenditure switching e¤ect raises European output and
consumption but tends to reduce US output and consumption.
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A European shock raises European output by less than a US shock raises
US output despite the fact that the preceding analysis might suggest the
opposite. The intuition behind this result is as follows. As mentioned, in
the case of a US shock, the depreciation of the dollar implies an expenditure
switching e¤ect in Europe ("the other country"). This causes an increase
in US output and consumption. In the case of a European shock, due to
DP, the depreciation of the euro does not a¤ect the price of imports in the
US ("the other country") and there is no expenditure switching e¤ect in the
US. This direct demand increase dominates the expenditure switching e¤ect
in that the positive impact of a European monetary shock on European
output is smaller than the positive impact on a US monetary shock on US
output. Asymmetric expenditure switching e¤ects explain the asymmetric
transmission of US and European monetary shocks.
Panel (d) of Figure 3 shows that a European monetary shock decreases
US consumption. With no exchange rate pass-through to import prices in the
US, the depreciation of the euro does not cause the US CPI to fall. Thus the
mechanism that allows for an increase in European consumption following a
US shock does not increase US consumption in the case of a European shock.
Due to DP, the exchange rate change mainly impacts on the pro…ts of …rms.
The depreciation of the euro reduces the dollar earning of US …rms, which
tends to reduce US consumption.
Figure 3 and Table 1 show that the welfare e¤ects of a European monetary
shock are, despite the asymmetric transmission of shocks, almost identical to
those of a US shock. The only notable di¤erence being that a European shock
reduces US consumption (panel (d)). In this case, the welfare bene…t from a
lower level of US employment almost perfectly o¤sets the welfare losses from
a lower level of US consumption in that the e¤ect of a European shock on US
welfare is almost the same as the e¤ect of a US shock on European welfare.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the e¤ect of a European monetary
shock on US output is not sensitive to the choice of parameter values. The
expenditure switching e¤ect in Europe dominates the direct demand increase
coming from US households. A European shock decreases US output also in
the case of ? = 3 or ? = 0?5.
3.3.3 An Appraisal of the Merits of the DP Model
It is a challenge for any open economy model to capture some international
business-cycle regularities. The stylized facts of international business cycles
include the following observations:
² US monetary policy has a positive e¤ect on both US and "European"
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(the non-US G7 countries) output and consumption (e.g. Holman and
Neumann 2002).
² Co-movements of output across countries are larger than co-movements
of consumption across countries (Backus et al. 1992).
² Nominal and real exchange rates are highly correlated (Mussa 1986).
² The real exchange rate is more volatile than the terms of trade (Men-
doza 1995).
² Nominal depreciations are associated with deteriorations of the terms
of trade (Obstfeld and Rogo¤ 2000).
² US monetary policy a¤ects US output more than European monetary
policy a¤ects European output (Angeloni et al. 2003).
As shown by Schmidt (2006), the incorporation of DP into the NOEM
model leads to results that conform more closely to the …rst stylized fact than
the LCP or PCP models. I show, however, that predictions regarding the co-
movement of output across countries are sensitive to the choice of some key
parameter values. A monetary shock under DP does not necessarily increase
both US and European output and consumption. DP is, however, a potential
explanation for the …rst observation.
In terms of the correlations of output and consumption across countries,
the results provide for more risk sharing than is shown in the data. Even if
a US monetary shock increases European output, the shock generates pos-
itive co-movements of consumption that are smaller than the positive co-
movements of output across countries. In a case in which a monetary shock
decreases European output, the DP model appears to provide results that
are similar to those of the PCP model: high international consumption corre-
lations relative to output correlations. These correlations are not consistent
with empirical evidence. Furthermore, a European shock generates negative
correlations of output and consumption across countries.
It is apparent that DP implies a lower correlation between the nominal
and real exchange rates than in the case of LCP. As shown by Betts and
Devereux (2000), in the basic NOEM framework, where preferences are iden-
tical across regions, the correlation between nominal and real exchange rates
depends on the degree of LCP. Since DP is based on partial LCP, the LCP
model does a better job in terms of nominal and real exchange rates being
highly correlated in the short run.
If volatility is measured by the impact e¤ect of a shock, DP can be one
reason why the US real exchange rate is more volatile than the US terms of
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trade. There are relatively few models that can explain this phenomenon.
If all goods are traded, it is a common result that the volatility of the real
exchange rate is proportional to that of the terms of trade (as in the LCP
version of this model). In the DP case, exchange rate movements do not
a¤ect the US terms of trade because both import and export prices are set
in dollars. However, exchange rate movements a¤ect the real exchange rate
to the extent that prices are sticky and set in the consumers’ currency. For
these reasons, the terms of trade are less volatile than the real exchange rate.
The DP model (as well as the LCP model) predicts that a currency de-
preciation is associated with an improvement in the country’s terms of trade.
This is inconsistent with the empirical evidence showing that currency depre-
ciations are associated with deteriorations rather than improvements of the
terms of trade (Obstfeld and Rogo¤ 2000). Only the PCP model is consistent
with this observation.
Dollar pricing can explain the observed asymmetry in the e¤ectiveness of
US and European monetary policies. In an empirical paper Angeloni et al.
(2003) study the transmission of US and European monetary policy. Using
large-scale "structural" macro-econometrics models, the authors …nd that a
one percentage point increase in the US short-term interest rate has a sub-
stantially stronger negative e¤ect on US output than a one percentage point
increase in the Eurozone’s interest rate has on the Eurozone’s output. This
implies that US monetary policy is more e¤ective in in‡uencing output than
European monetary policy. The standard explanation for this asymmetry is
summarized by de Grauwe and Costa Storti (2005, 2): "A consensus seems to
have emerged that because of the existence of labour market rigidities, mon-
etary policies in the Eurozone are less e¤ective in in‡uencing output than is
the case in the US." In this paper, I show that under DP European monetary
policy a¤ects European output and consumption by less than US monetary
policy a¤ects US output and consumption. Asymmetric export pricing can
be one reason for the relative e¤ectiveness of US monetary policy. This result
may be relevant in that considerable export pricing is conducted in dollars.
4 Conclusions
The main point of this paper is to analyse the international transmission of
monetary policy in the case where all export prices are set in US dollars.
I show that asymmetric exchange rate pass-through implies that the inter-
national e¤ects of US monetary shocks are di¤erent to those of European
shocks. For example, DP can explain the asymmetry in the e¤ectiveness of
monetary policy. In the case of DP, US monetary policy has a stronger e¤ect
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on US output than European policy has on European output. I also show
that under DP expansionary monetary policy is a beggar-thy-neighbour pol-
icy. It increases the country’s own overall welfare at the expense of the other
country.
Consistent with Schmidt (2006), I …nd that DP can more accurately ex-
plain the positive transmission of US monetary shocks to Europe (i.e. that
a US monetary shock has a positive e¤ect on both US and European output
and consumption). The DP model can provide a better …t with this stylized
fact than other pricing schemes (PCP or LCP). I show, however, that the
sign of the change in European output is sensitive to the choice of parameter
values.
Modelling suggests that the DP model provides a closer …t to some of
the stylized facts. It is, however, weaker than the LCP model at projecting
changes in consumption patterns and changes in output correlations across
countries. The LCP model, however, predicts that the correlation between
US and European consumption is negative. This prediction is inconsistent
with empirical evidence. It is a challenge for NOEM models to provide
for the observation that co-movements of output and consumption across
countries are positive and that outputs are correlated to a higher degree
than consumptions. A great deal of work remains to be done in explaining
international business-cycle regularities.
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Figure 1: Dynamic E¤ects of US Monetary Shocks under Symmetric Pricing
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Figure 2: Dynamics E¤ects of US Monetary Shocks under Dollar Pricing
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Figure 3: Dynamic E¤ects of US and European Monetary Shocks under
Dollar Pricing
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